TSA holds officers individually responsible for following standard operating procedures.
Our previous article documented firings at Honolulu, Fort Myers, Newark, and Atlanta, including a case in which the inspector general later found that staffing and equipment contributed to the lapse. This article examines a case in which covert testing found a problem tied to a procedure set above the officers, and in which oversight officials have struggled to obtain the results.
For the disciplinary record, see SOP Deviations Can End Your Career.
The Policy and the Test
In July 2025, the secretary of homeland security announced that most passengers would no longer have to remove their shoes at the checkpoint, ending a requirement in place since 2006. Officers began screening under the revised procedure.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General then conducted covert tests to determine whether "checkpoint screening technologies, related procedures, and transportation security officers prevent threat items from being brought onto commercial aircraft." The final report, issued November 1, 2025, "contains information that is classified or otherwise not available for public viewing."
On August 26, 2025, before the report was final, the inspector general sent the secretary a Seven-Day Letter, a notice used for problems that require prompt corrective action. The same letter, citing press reports, states that covert testing found certain full-body scanners "can't scan shoes."
Access to the Findings
At a Senate Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, the committee's chairman said the inspector general "has told my office several times that he's been restricted by a DHS memo from speaking to certain congressional committees about a classified report," and that the report is "about covert testing of the Transportation Security Administration's checkpoint security screening." He said the Government Accountability Office, which he asked to review the matter, "has said they've been unable to obtain possession of the report and access to relevant Transportation Security Administration personnel."
Federal oversight rules required TSA to respond to the report with a management decision, the document in which an agency states whether it agrees with the findings and lists "planned corrective actions and target completion dates," within 90 days. The April 3, 2026, letter states that the deadline was January 30, 2026, and that TSA "failed to submit the Management Decision within 90 days," which the letter called a violation of "Federal law, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and DHS's own directives." The letter asked TSA to rescind the policy "until the agency implements comprehensive corrective action and the DHS OIG tests and verifies" the fix.
The July Review
On July 16, 2026, the inspector general notified TSA that it was "initiating a verification review" of the covert testing report. The stated objective is "to verify whether TSA's corrective actions in response to the recommendations achieved intended results." The notice states that the inspector general "has a right of access to all records, information, and other materials available to the Department."
The notice was addressed to the official then performing the duties of the administrator, who left the agency weeks later. It does not describe the corrective actions, say when TSA reported them, or say whether TSA filed a management decision. It is the first public document on the matter since April.
Effect on Officers
Covert testing measures officers and technology together. Its purpose is to find where detection fails, and the results do not separate officer error, equipment limits, and gaps created by the procedure in use.
The shoe policy was announced by the Department of Homeland Security, and officers carried it out at the checkpoint. Covert testing then produced a finding serious enough for a Seven-Day Letter. A department memo restricted the inspector general from discussing the report with some of the committees that oversee TSA, and the Government Accountability Office could not obtain it. Officers continued to screen passengers under the same procedure during that period.
No public record indicates that officers were blamed for the test results. Because the report is classified, the public record contains few details about the findings themselves.
Open Questions
The verification review is underway under a new administrator, confirmed in August. No public document we have found shows whether TSA submitted a management decision, whether the department rescinded the memo restricting the inspector general, or whether the shoe procedure has changed. The inspector general's verification review will be the first public statement on whether TSA's corrective actions worked.
Against Giants has not reviewed the classified report. This article relies on the inspector general's public documents, a congressional letter published in full, and a committee chairman's statement on the record.
Sources: DHS OIG-26-01, public highlights; OIG Project No. 26-040-AUD-TSA, notification of verification review, July 16, 2026; letter from a United States senator to TSA, April 3, 2026; opening statement, Senate Judiciary Committee oversight hearing.
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